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COUNTERFEITING, COUTURE, AND THE DECLINE OF CONSUMER TRUST
I. INTRODUCTION
 This article explores how the increase of counterfeit goods available across popular 
online marketplace platforms has created a unique opportunity for brand owners to 
persuade their customers to return to legitimate online sources that sell authentic 
goods. The f lood of counterfeit goods on online marketplace platforms is 
overwhelming, and it has become exceedingly difficult for consumers seeking 
authentic goods to acquire them through these avenues with any degree of confidence.1 
Further, these platforms have no real incentive to regulate the conduct of sellers 
offering counterfeit goods, especially since there exists a great opportunity for them to 
profit off the sales.2 Because consumers can no longer rely on online marketplace 
platforms to provide them with authentic goods, they have no other viable alternative 
than to obtain these goods through a brand’s website or its authorized online retailers.
 Part II of this article explores counterfeiting and how it has evolved as a business 
through the years. Part III traces the evolution of the core legal protections that 
brand owners use to prevent their goods from being counterfeited. Part IV reviews 
the problem of counterfeiting on online marketplace platforms and its impact on 
consumers of authentic goods. Part V concludes the discussion.
II. WHAT IS COUNTERFEITING?
 Counterfeiting is a profitable business of tremendous global impact, spanning 
across a number of industries, including apparel and accessories, music, electronics, 
software, consumer goods, toys, medications, mechanical parts, and cigarettes.3 The 
estimated value of global trade in counterfeit and pirated goods in 2013 was $461 
billion.4 In fiscal year 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations (“Customs”) conducted 
1. See NetNames, Counting the Cost of Counterfeiting 4 (2015) (“In an environment where 
counterfeiting is as profitable as illegal drugs, . . . we are seeing explosive growth. Expanding by over 
15% every year, counterfeiting now costs more than 2% of total global economic output, or around $1.8 
trillion per year. There is little doubt as to the crucial role played by the digital world in this meteoric 
rise, with a 15% increase in sales of counterfeit goods online last year.”); id. at 9.
2. See Keith Anderson, The Struggle Is Real for Brands Competing with Amazon’s 3P Sellers, Profitero: Blog 
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.profitero.com/2016/04/the-struggle-is-real-for-brands-competing-with-
amazons-3p-sellers (“Amazon’s 3P [third-party] seller marketplace has been on a tear since the first 
quarter of 2014, increasing from 39% of paid units in 4Q13 to 47% in 4Q15.”); id. (stating that this 
enhances price competition, selection, and profitability in particular, as “[i]t’s not uncommon for Amazon 
to make more when a 3P Seller wins the Buy Box than when it wins itself ”); Michael Sacca, Amazon’s 
Counterfeit Goods Problem and How It Could Affect Their Brand Equity, Brandisty: Blog, http://blog.
brandisty.com/brand-management-blog/amazon-s-counterfeit-goods-problem (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) 
(“Amazon has little incentive to regulate this marketplace. For 3P sales Amazon only reports fees paid by 
vendors to Amazon and not the cost of goods sold, thus offering gross margins of 90 to 100% while its 
traditional retail business has gross margins of about 20%. On paper, this looks excellent to investors.”).
3. See What Is Counterfeiting?, IACC, http://www.iacc.org/resources/about/what-is-counterfeiting (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2017).
4. OECD & EUIPO, Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact 
11 (2016).
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31,560 seizures of illicit imports that involved counterfeit and pirated goods, a 34% 
increase from just two years prior.5 This resulted in 451 arrests, 304 indictments, and 
272 convictions.6 As of 2016, apparel and accessories accounted for 20% of total 
seizures conducted by Customs.7 Seizures of watches and jewelry accounted for the 
highest percentage in value, had these goods been genuine.8 The primary trading 
partners involved in these 2016 seizures were China, with 45% of the total value, and 
Hong Kong, with 43% of the total value.9
 Counterfeiters routinely misappropriate the valuable trademarks10 of countless 
brands to secure their profits, depriving trademark owners of the revenue to which 
they are entitled and diminishing the goodwill11 associated with a brand.12 Counterfeit 
versions of authentic goods also frequently present marked health and safety 
consequences for consumers who purchase them.13 The scope of counterfeiting has 
grown so much that profits support not only the activities of the infringers, but also 
those involved in organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorist groups.14
 Developments in technology have further enhanced the problem of counterfeiting, 
making it easier for counterfeiters to sell illicit goods and more challenging for 
5. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Office of Trade, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Intellectual 
Property Rights Seizure Statistics: Fiscal Year 2016 2 (2017) [hereinafter 2016 Seizure 
Statistics], https://www.cbp.gov/document/report/fy-2016-intellectual-property-rights-seizure/
statistics (follow “FY 2016 Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Statistics” hyperlink); see U.S. Customs 
& Border Prot. Office of Trade, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Intellectual Property 
Rights: Fiscal Year 2015 Seizure Statistics 6 (2015), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/
ipr/statistics (follow “FY 2015 Seizure Statistics” hyperlink).
6. 2016 Seizure Statistics, supra note 5, at 2.
7. Id. at 8 (accounting for 6,406 of the 31,560 total seizures conducted by Customs).
8. Id. at 10. Watches and jewelry accounted for 47% of the value of goods seized by Customs in 2016, a 
value of $653,590,442 had they been genuine. Id. This number increased from 43% of the total value in 
2015. Id.
9. Id. at 12.
10. Trademark, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A word, phrase, logo, or other sensory symbol 
used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its products or services from those of others. The main 
purpose of a trademark is to designate the source of goods or services. In effect, the trademark is the 
commercial substitute for one’s signature. To receive federal protection, a trademark must be (1) 
distinctive rather than merely descriptive or generic; (2) affixed to a product that is actually sold in the 
marketplace; and (3) registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. In its broadest sense, the 
term trademark includes a servicemark. Unregistered trademarks are protected under common-law only, 
and distinguished with the mark ‘TM.’”).
11. Goodwill, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A business’s reputation, patronage, and other 
intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business, esp[ecially] for purchase; the ability 
to earn income in excess of the income that would be expected from the business viewed as a mere 
collection of assets. Because an established business’s trademark or servicemark is a symbol of goodwill, 
trademark infringement is a form of theft of goodwill. By the same token, when a trademark is assigned, 
the goodwill that it carries is also assigned.”).
12. The Comm’n on the Theft of Am. Intellectual Prop., The IP Commission Report 47–49 (2013). 
13. Tim Phillips, Knockoff: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods 21–25 (2005).
14. See What Is Counterfeiting?, supra note 3.
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consumers to purchase authentic goods on the Internet.15 Counterfeiters can now
easily remain anonymous by using false identities in connection with websites, 
and can transfer their operation from one domain name to the next, as soon as 
one website selling counterfeits is shut down. Moreover, even when a trademark 
owner is able to identify and obtain a judgment against an actual person, 
counterfeiters often hide their assets, either in banks outside the United States 
or in international banks with a presence in the United States that resist 
complying with U.S. court process, making collection efforts difficult.16
 In recent years, the problem of counterfeiting has expanded on the Internet to 
include the sale and distribution of counterfeit goods on online marketplace platforms 
such as auction websites (eBay, for example), online trade boards (Alibaba, for 
example), and shopping websites (Amazon, for example).17 Traditionally, these 
platforms were intended to provide legitimate forums for businesses and consumers 
to promote and purchase goods, sometimes at a significantly higher volume than 
traditional retail forums.18 However, these platforms provide new avenues for 
counterfeiters to sell massive amounts of counterfeit goods while appealing to a 
broader customer base across the globe. Counterfeiters are now so deeply entrenched 
in auction websites, shopping websites, and online trade boards that these websites 
are no longer reliable avenues for consumers seeking to purchase authentic goods.
III. COUNTERFEITING AND THE LAW
 Trademark counterfeiting is defined as the act of manufacturing or distributing a 
product or service bearing a mark that is identical to or substantially indistinguishable 
from a registered trademark.19 A number of civil and criminal federal and state laws 
currently provide brand owners with the necessary tools to combat counterfeiting.20
15. NetNames, supra note 1, at 9, 29–31. The Internet provides opportunities for many to increase sales by 
creating or hijacking domain names, posting product listings on websites, sending information on social 
media, and utilizing mobile apps. Id. Further, 3D printing is projected to contribute an additional $100 
billion in IP losses by 2018. Id. at 31.
16. Lois F. Herzeca & Howard S. Hogan, Fashion Law and Business 325 (2013).
17. See Kurt M. Saunders & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, The Liability of Online Markets for Counterfeit Goods: 
A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Trademark Infringement in the United States and Europe, 32 Nw. J. 
Int’l L. & Bus. 37, 38 (2011). 
18. See Andy Geldman, Amazon Seller’s Survey 2016: The Results, WebRetailer (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.
webretailer.com/lean-commerce/amazon-sellers-survey-2016 (discussing various sellers’ annual revenue 
derived from sales on online forums, such as Amazon, eBay, Sears, and Etsy where, for example, 36% of 
sellers who sold on Amazon earned $100,000 to $1 million, and another 13% earned between $1 and $10 
million); Laura Stevens, Survey Shows Rapid Growth in Online Shopping, Wall Street J. (June 8, 2016, 
12:03 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/survey-shows-rapid-growth-in-online-shopping-1465358582 
(discussing the significance of online consumption, evidenced by survey results in which shoppers made 
51% of their purchases on the Internet compared to just 20% made in traditional stores).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d)(1), 1127 (2012).
20. New York state law criminalizes trademark counterfeiting. Section 165.71 of the New York Penal Law 
provides that third-degree trademark counterfeiting—a class A misdemeanor—can occur “when, with 
the intent to deceive or defraud some other person or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the 
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 The Lanham Act is the authoritative federal statute that addresses civil trademark 
counterfeiting.21 Section 32 of the Lanham Act is one of the primary legal provisions 
that brand owners rely on when seeking to define infringing conduct, and is 
particularly relevant when pursuing a civil action against counterfeiters and infringers 
that misappropriate their marks.22 The Lanham Act provides brand owners with 
additional tools to seek remedies against counterfeiters in the civil context, including 
actual or statutory damages; preliminary or permanent injunctions or both; the 
seizure and destruction of counterfeit goods; reimbursement of litigation costs; and 
in some circumstances, reimbursement of attorney’s fees.23 Ex parte seizure orders 
against counterfeiters are remarkable remedies, as they allow federal courts to order 
the seizure of counterfeit goods through a proceeding initiated by a brand owner 
without any prior notice being issued to the adversary.24
 In 1984, violations of the Lanham Act were criminalized to provide more discrete 
penalties against trademark counterfeiting.25 Congress passed the Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act,26 which punishes anyone who intentionally “traffics in goods or 
services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or 
services.”27 Under this act, counterfeiting is punishable by up to ten years in prison and 
a $2 million fine for an individual and up to $5 million for an entity.28 If found to have 
knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury by counterfeiting, an individual 
could be sentenced to up to twenty years in prison and fined $5 million; an entity could 
be fined as much as $15 million.29 If found to have knowingly or recklessly caused 
death by counterfeiting, an individual could be punished with life in prison and fined 
up to $5 million; an entity could be fined up to $15 million.30 These penalties are 
important because they provide substantial consequences for those individuals and 
entities engaging in the business of counterfeiting.
sale . . . or distribution of goods, [a person] manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which 
bear a counterfeit trademark.” N.Y. Penal Law § 165.71 (McKinney 2017). The same conduct is 
punishable as a class E felony when the retail value of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks exceeds 
$1,000, id. § 165.72 (second-degree trademark counterfeiting), and as a class C felony when the value of 
such goods exceeds $100,000, id. § 165.73 (first-degree trademark counterfeiting). For an overview of 
federal protections against counterfeiting, see infra text accompanying notes 21–42.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1127.
22. Id. § 1114.
23. Id. §§ 1114, 1116–1118.
24. Id. § 1116(d).
25. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2320 (2012)).
26. Id. 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1).
28. Id. § 2320(b)(1)(A).
29. Id. § 2320(b)(2)(A).
30. Id. § 2320(b)(2)(B).
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 A number of other important federal statutes are often used to prosecute 
counterfeiters. For example, criminal penalties for those who engage in copyright 
infringement ref lect changes in technology that have made it easier for infringers 
and counterfeiters to reproduce and disseminate copyrighted works on the Internet.31 
Also, counterfeiters who attempt to smuggle infringing goods into the United States32 
and enter them into commerce33 are subject to significant penalties.34
 Further, the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996,35 which 
amended the Racketeer Inf luenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, provides 
protections against criminal infringement of a copyright, trafficking in goods or 
services bearing counterfeit marks, and trafficking in counterfeit labels for 
phonorecords, computer programs, computer program documentation, or packaging 
and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works.36 This act defines conduct 
related to counterfeiting as a “racketeering activity.”37
 In the past decade, additional legal protections have been introduced to provide 
brand owners with more powerful tools to combat the problem of counterfeiting. The 
Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act38 established prison terms of up to 
twenty years and fines up to $15 million, along with mandatory forfeiture, destruction, 
and restitution provisions for the trafficking and sale of counterfeit goods.39 The 
legislation also established restrictions on the shipment of falsified labels or packaging.40 
Further, the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 
2008 increased both civil and criminal penalties for trademark, patent, and copyright 
infringement.41 It also established a new executive branch office, the Office of the 
United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, which is tasked with 
coordinating national and international intellectual property enforcement measures.42
IV. THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERFEITING ON ONLINE MARKETPLACE PLATFORMS
 The laws referenced in the previous section serve as the core protections that 
brand owners use to prevent their goods from being counterfeited. The problem of 
31. Id. § 2319.
32. Id. § 545.
33. Id. § 542.
34. Penalties for smuggling can include fines and imprisonment up to twenty years; entering counterfeit 
goods into commerce is punishable with fines and imprisonment up to two years. Id. §§ 542, 545.
35. Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1963.
37. Id. § 1961(1)(B).
38. Pub. L. No. 109-181, 120 Stat. 285 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2320).
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2320, 2323.
40. Id. § 2320.
41. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 8111 (2012).
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counterfeiting, however, has continued to expand and brand owners are faced with 
adapting these laws to innovations in technology that help facilitate the illegal 
conduct of counterfeiters.
 In recent years, online marketplace platforms like auction websites, online trade 
boards, and shopping websites have become some of the most popular avenues for 
counterfeiters to use to offer and sell counterfeit goods on the Internet. The sheer 
volume of counterfeit products being offered on these platforms—along with the 
difficulties that brand owners continue to experience in monitoring them—has 
created an environment where consumers of authentic goods are not adequately 
protected from fraud.43 Counterfeiting is a profitable enterprise that provides income 
to these platforms largely through transaction fees, so there is no real incentive for 
site administrators to regulate infringing listings. The sale of counterfeit goods has 
contaminated the business models of these platforms, and these platforms can no 
longer be considered reliable avenues through which consumers may confidently 
purchase authentic goods.
 Through the years, a limited number of lawsuits have been filed against online 
marketplace platforms to protect the interests of brand owners and consumers against 
counterfeiting. For example, in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., Tiffany & Co. (“Tiffany”) 
brought an action against the auction website eBay, on which alleged counterfeit 
goods were being sold.44 Tiffany entered claims of direct and contributory trademark 
infringement,45 trademark dilution,46 and false advertising47 against eBay for 
facilitating and allowing counterfeit goods to be sold on its auction website.48
43. NetNames, supra note 1, at 9, 26. The Counting the Cost of Counterfeiting report asserts that Taobao 
handled 87 million IP-infringing product listings in 2012 alone. Id. at 9. It goes on to note that enforcement 
is particularly difficult because “[a]uction sites and online marketplaces  .  .  . offer counterfeiters an easy 
route to sell their goods online in vast numbers, with almost complete anonymity.” Id. at 33.
44. 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
45. Direct trademark infringement maintains a two-pronged test that “asks first whether the plaintiff ’s 
mark is valid and entitled to protection, and second whether the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to 
cause [consumers’] confusion as to the origin [or sponsorship] of the [defendant’s] goods.” Id. at 495. In 
contrast, contributory trademark infringement looks first to whether a defendant “intentionally induces 
another to infringe a trademark, or if [the defendant] continues to supply its product to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Id. at 502 (quoting Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)). 
46. Dilution by blurring is an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” Id. at 524 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(2)(B)). In contrast, dilution by tarnishment is an “association arising from the similarity between 
a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.” Id. (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C)).
47. False advertising claims asserted in violation of federal law fall under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
Id. at 519–20. Section 43(a) prohibits any person, “in commercial advertising or promotion, [from] 
misrepresent[ing] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.” Id. at 520 n.42 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)).
48. Id. at 469.
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 The court decided in favor of eBay on all three claims,49 and Tiffany appealed.50 
On appeal, the court held that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s trademark on its auction 
website and in sponsored links did not constitute direct trademark infringement.51 
Further, the court found that eBay’s general knowledge of infringement of Tiffany’s 
trademark on its auction website was not sufficient to impose an affirmative duty on 
eBay to resolve the issue.52 In essence, the court held that eBay could not be held 
vicariously liable for trademark infringement solely on the basis of generalized 
knowledge that infringement was occurring from sales made through the auction 
website.53 Therefore, eBay was not liable for contributory trademark infringement in 
facilitating its vendors’ infringing conduct.54 The court entered a judgment in favor 
of eBay with respect to claims of trademark infringement and dilution, and remanded 
to the district court on the false advertising claim.55
 On remand, the district court found that eBay was not liable for false advertising.56 
The court held that Tiffany could not establish that consumers were being misled by 
eBay’s advertisements.57 Tiffany did not appeal this ruling.
 Until the Tiffany decision, there was no clear allocation of responsibility to a 
party to monitor unauthorized trademark uses on auction websites. The decision 
established an important standard that placed this burden to monitor on the brand 
owner or its authorized representative (outside counsel or a private investigator, for 
example) and not on the auction website itself. As a result of this decision, auction 
websites like eBay will continue to have counterfeit goods available for purchase on 
their platforms, and consumers will remain unsure whether the goods they are 
purchasing will be authentic.
 Despite Tiffany, courts outside the United States have arrived at different 
conclusions about the liability of auction websites selling and distributing counterfeit 
goods.58 In three separate cases brought by the luxury group Louis Vuitton Moët 
49. Id. at 527.
50. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
51. Id. at 103. 
52. Id. at 107. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 108.
55. Id. at 114.
56. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4607(RJS), 2010 WL 3733894, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2010).
57. Id. at *2–3.
58. Trademarks are protected in the European Union (EU) by individual member state regulation and by EU 
directive. Annette Kur, Convergence After All? A Comparative View on the U.S. and EU Trademark Systems 
in the Light of the “Trade Mark Study,” 19 J. Intell. Prop. L. 305, 307–08 (2012). Through the Trade 
Mark Directive and the Community Trade Mark Regulation, a “community trademark” may be 
registered and subsequently enforced throughout the EU by one registration. Id. at 307–08. Unlike the 
United States, which utilizes a “use” standard, the EU recognizes a trademark upon registration. Id. at 
310; see also 4 European Union Law Guide §§ 23:1–23:19, Westlaw (Philip Rawroth ed., database 
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Hennessey (LVMH), a French court found that eBay was liable for failing to police 
its marketplace for counterfeits and for taking part in promoting infringing goods 
outside approved distribution networks.59 Consequently, the Commercial Court of 
Paris ordered eBay to pay €38.6 million (approximately $60.8 million) to LVMH for 
permitting the sale of counterfeit goods on its auction website.60 The court also 
granted LVMH an injunction that required eBay to stop selling counterfeit LVMH 
products and to cease all sales of genuine LVMH perfumes and cosmetics on the 
ground that eBay was not part of the approved distribution channel through which 
companies manufacturing products can restrict the sale of their products to approved 
distributors only.61 Subsequently, eBay requested that the French Court of Appeal 
stay the injunction while it appealed the rest of the ruling, but the stay was denied.62
 The LVMH cases, though factually similar to the Tiffany decision, concluded 
differently and ultimately placed the burden to monitor unauthorized uses of a 
trademark on an auction website instead of a brand owner.63 Tiffany held that 
generalized knowledge of counterfeit merchandise offered and sold on an auction site 
was insufficient to hold eBay liable, and that specific knowledge on behalf of eBay 
was required.64 In contrast, SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay Inc. found that eBay 
should have known that items being sold were counterfeit, and should have removed 
the listings on the basis of the prices asked and quantities offered.65 In an international 
context, the differences between these two cases illustrate the inherent tension that 
exists between unauthorized uses of a trademark and the party that is responsible to 
remedy those unauthorized uses through enforcement activities on auction websites.66
 While the Tiffany decision explored which party is responsible for monitoring 
unauthorized uses of a trademark on auction websites, Gucci America, Inc. v. Alibaba 
updated Nov. 2016) (providing an overview on the harmonization of trademark law in the EU); Casey L. 
Tripoli, Note, Fashion Forward: The Need for a Proactive Approach to the Counterfeit Epidemic, 41 Brook. J. 
Int’l L. 875, 897–904 (2016) (discussing the legal framework for trademark protection and enforcement 
in the EU).
59. Tribunal de commerce [Trib. com.] [commercial court] Paris, 1ère chambre B, June 30, 2008, No. 
2006077799 (Fr.) (SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay Inc.); Tribunal de commerce [Trib. com.] 
[commercial court] Paris, 1ère chambre B, June 30, 2008, No. 2006077807 (Fr.) (Christian Dior 
Couture, SA v. eBay Inc.); Tribunal de commerce [Trib. com.] [commercial court] Paris, 1ère chambre 
B, June 30, 2008, No. 2006065217 (Fr.) (S.A. Parfums Christian Dior v. eBay Inc.). For a concise 
English summary of the action, see Catherine Levalet, In the Courts: Legal Pioneering at the Online 
Auction Frontier, WIPO Mag., June 2009, at 18, 18–19.
60. See cases cited supra note 59; see also Doreen Carvajal, EBay Ordered to Pay $61 Million in Sale of Counterfeit 
Goods, N.Y. Times (July 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/technology/01ebay.html.
61. Trib. com., June 30, 2008, No. 2006065217, at 16.
62. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1ère chambre P, July 11, 2008.
63. See cases cited supra note 59.
64. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
65. Tribunal de commerce [Trib. com.] [commercial court] Paris, 1ère chambre B, June 30, 2008, No. 
2006077799, at 12 (Fr.).
66. See also L’Oreal SA v. eBay Int’l AG [2009] EWCH (Ch) 1094 (Eng.).
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Group Holding Ltd. focused on online trade portals.67 Kering S.A. (“Kering”), Gucci’s 
holding company, brought an action against Alibaba Group Holding Limited 
(“Alibaba”), the publicly traded Hangzhou-based group of e-commerce businesses, to 
clarify which party is responsible for monitoring unauthorized uses of a trademark 
on online trade board portals.68 Kering alleged that Alibaba “encourage[ed], 
assist[ed], and profit[ed]” from the widespread sale of counterfeit goods on its online 
trade board portals.69
 Kering alleged that Alibaba conspired to manufacture, offer for sale, and traffic 
in counterfeit products that infringed on a number of protectable trademarks, 
including the famous brands Balenciaga, Bottega Veneta, Gucci, and Yves Saint 
Laurent.70 Kering stated:
The Alibaba Defendants facilitate and encourage the sale of an enormous 
number of Counterfeit Products through their self-described “ecosystem,” 
which provides manufacturers, sellers, and buyers of counterfeit goods with a 
marketplace for such goods, and provides online marketing, credit card 
processing, financing, and shipping services that effectuate the sale of the 
Counterfeit Products.71
Kering brought this action seeking injunctive relief preventing Alibaba or its 
associates from manufacturing, distributing, marketing, or selling infringing items, 
as well as disgorgement of profits, and statutory and punitive damages.72
 Alibaba is the controversial subject of a 2015 Chinese government report issued 
by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) that analyzed the 
“long-term illegal transaction problems of the entry, sales, management and other 
aspects on Alibaba’s online trade platform.”73 Among other allegations, this report 
accused Alibaba of insufficient monitoring and regulation of illegal activities, fraud, 
and illegal advertising and promotional activities, as well as allowing merchants to 
illegally infringe trademarks, sell counterfeit merchandise, make unauthorized use of 
67. Complaint, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. filed 
May 15, 2015). This case is currently pending.
68. Id. at 2–4. The plaintiffs were Gucci America, Inc., Balenciaga America, Inc., Bottega Veneta S.A., 
Bottega Veneta Inc., Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc., Luxury Goods International S.A., and Kering. 
I refer to the plaintiffs collectively as Kering.
69. Id. at 3. Alibaba consists of online retail consumer-to-consumer (“C2C”), business-to-consumer (“B2C”), 
and business-to-business (“B2B”) trading portals that are incredibly profitable: two of Alibaba’s portals 
alone handled 1.1 trillion yuan ($170 billion) in sales in 2012. See Alibaba Group News, Statistics, Market 
Share and Insights, China Internet Watch, https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/tag/alibaba (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2017). Alibaba collects money from transaction fees connected to its businesses through 
the payment service Alipay. See Alipay, https://intl.alipay.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
70. Complaint, supra note 67, at 1–2.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 137–41.
73. Zheping Huang, The Chinese Government Has Erased a Damning Report on Alibaba, but You Can Read It 
Here, Quartz (Jan. 29, 2015), http://qz.com/335675/the-chinese-government-has-erased-a-damning-
report-on-alibaba-but-you-can-read-it-here.
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others’ business names, and falsify transaction history and evaluations.74 This report 
has since been removed from the SAIC website.75
 Further, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) publishes a 
Notorious Markets List that features “select online and physical marketplaces that 
reportedly engage in and facilitate substantial copyright piracy and trademark 
counterfeiting.”76 In 2015, the USTR wrote in its report that it was “increasingly 
concerned by rights holders’ reports that Alibaba Group’s enforcement program is 
too slow, difficult to use, and lacks transparency.”77 Though the USTR has listed 
Alibaba on its Notorious Markets List in past years, it did not list Alibaba for 2015, 
and instead “encourage[d] the company to enhance cooperation with all stakeholders 
to address ongoing complaints.”78 The USTR also stated: 
Given the size and the scale of Alibaba’s platforms, stronger and more 
efficient systems for addressing right holders’ concerns should be undertaken 
without delay. Such steps should include (1) simplifying Taobao’s processes 
for rights holders to register and request enforcement action, (2) making 
Taobao’s good faith takedown procedures generally available, and (3) reducing 
Taobao’s timelines for takedowns and issuing penalties for counterfeit sellers.79
Taobao, one of Alibaba’s most popular and profitable trade board portals, was also 
recently at the center of an action brought by Louis Vuitton in Beijing’s Haidian 
District Court against three Taobao sellers seeking damages in connection with the 
sale and distribution of counterfeit goods.80
 Online trade boards, like Alibaba, pose vast counterfeiting problems that make it 
impossible for consumers to have confidence that they can purchase authentic goods. 
Thus, the only viable alternative is to return to the source and purchase a brand’s 
goods through a company’s website or its authorized online retailers.
 Counterfeiting has even extended well beyond notorious platforms like eBay and 
Alibaba to disrupt the business models of more legitimate shopping websites like 
Amazon and Etsy.com.81 Traditionally, Amazon has been regarded as one of the 
more trustworthy online marketplaces for customers to confidently transact business, 
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2015 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets 
1 (2015).
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See India Ashok, Louis Vuitton Sues Chinese Counterfeit Online Sellers, Int’l Bus. Times (Jan. 11, 2016, 
06:35 GMT), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/louis-vuitton-sues-chinese-counterfeit-online-sellers-1537129. 
The case is currently pending.
81. See Lauren Gensler, Does Etsy Have a Problem with Fake Goods?, Forbes (May 11, 2015, 9:52 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2015/05/11/does-etsy-have-a-problem-with-fake-goods.
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enforcing a strong anti-counterfeiting policy against infringers of branded goods.82 
Amazon assures customers that they can trust in safely doing business with the 
company and that “[t]he sale of counterfeit products, including any products that 
have been illegally replicated, reproduced, or manufactured, is strictly prohibited.”83 
Amazon also states that if a seller is found to be offering counterfeit goods, the 
company “may immediately suspend or terminate .  .  . selling privileges and destroy 
inventory in [its] fulfillment centers without reimbursement.”84
 However, Amazon—likely in competitive response to the overwhelming 
influence and profitability of Alibaba in the online marketplace—has recently begun 
allowing sales from Chinese manufacturers who, until recently, had to transact 
through “middlemen, brands and private labels to reach global consumers.”85 With 
close to half of Amazon’s unit sales now flowing through its third-party marketplace, 
“[s]ales from Chinese-based sellers more than doubled in 2015 . . . , while the 
company’s total revenue increased 20 percent.”86 Amazon also provides ocean freight 
services, “simplifying the process for Chinese companies to ship goods directly to 
Amazon fulfillment centers, cutting out costs and inefficiencies,” making it easier to 
transport and sell counterfeit goods through its website.87
 In response to the abundance of counterfeit goods now available on Amazon, the 
German footwear company Birkenstock has stated that it will no longer allow its 
products—or any sales of its products by third-party sellers—to be sold on the 
website.88 David Kahan, CEO of Birkenstock Americas, stated in a company letter 
sent to the company’s retail partners that
[t]he Amazon marketplace, which operates as an “open market,” creates an 
environment where we experience unacceptable business practices which we 
believe jeopardize our brand. This includes postings by sellers proven to have 
counterfeit Birkenstock products. It also includes a  constant stream of 
unidentifiable unauthorized sellers who show a blatant disregard for our 
pricing policies. Policing this activity internally and in partnership with 
Amazon.com has proven impossible.89
Kahan further insisted that any products listed on Amazon are not to be trusted and 
that Birkenstock customers:
82. See Amazon Anti-Counterfeiting Policy, Amazon, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html/ref=help_search_1-1?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201166010 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
83. Id.
84. Id.




88. Ari Levy, Birkenstock Quits Amazon in US After Counterfeit Surge, CNBC (July 20, 2016, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/20/birkenstock-quits-amazon-in-us-after-counterfeit-surge.html.
89. Id. (quoting Letter from David Kahan, CEO, Birkenstock Ams., to Our Valued Birkenstock Partners 
(July 5, 2016)).
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should ONLY PURCHASE BIRKENSTOCK PRODUCTS FROM 
AUTHORIZED RETAILERS and that if [customers] see any “Birkenstock” 
product on Amazon.com, [Birkenstock] cannot in any way confirm its 
validity or verify its quality. It may be counterfeit. It may be stolen. It may be 
manufactured under questionable labor and environmental conditions. So, 
BUYER BEWARE.90
 Consumer trust in Amazon has also suffered as a result of manipulated product 
reviews, where at least four websites have been accused of accepting payment in 
exchange for submitting positive customer feedback on Amazon listings.91 In 
response, Amazon brought an action against a named operator of buyazonreviews.com, 
as well as unnamed operators of buyamazonreviews.com, bayreviews.net, and 
buyreviewsnow.com for trademark infringement, and violations of federal anti-
cybersquatting and Washington consumer protection laws.92
 The astonishing volume of counterfeit products that continue to be exchanged 
across the different avenues discussed in this section signifies that online marketplace 
platforms are deeply f lawed.
V. CONCLUSION
 This article explored the business of counterfeiting and its evolution, the core 
legal protections that are necessary for brand owners to employ when fighting against 
counterfeiters, and the impact that the problem of counterfeiting on online 
marketplace platforms has had on consumers of authentic goods. Counterfeit goods 
are available in tremendous quantity across popular online marketplace platforms, 
and consumers can no longer trust that they will be able to purchase authentic goods 
through them. As a result, brand owners should embrace this new opportunity to 
persuade these customers to purchase authentic goods through their own websites or 
through online retailers that are authorized to sell their goods.
90. Id. (quoting Letter from David Kahan, CEO, Birkenstock Ams., to Our Valued Birkenstock Partners, 
supra note 89). 
91. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 1–4, Amazon.com, Inc. v. Gentile, No. 15-2-08579-4 
SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 8, 2015); Jonathan Stempel, Amazon Sues to Block Alleged Fake 
Reviews on Its Website, Reuters (Apr. 9, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-
com-lawsuit-fake-reviews-idUSKBN0N02LP20150410. This case is currently pending.
92. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 91, at 1–4.
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